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Notes
Recognition and Organizational
Picketing: Effect of Employer's
Unfair Labor Practices
Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the National Labor Relations Act
was passed in 1959 to circumscribe recognition and or-
ganizational picketing by a union that has not been certi-
fied as the bargaining representative of the employees.
The uncertified union may picket for a limited time only
unless it petitions for an election. The following two Notes
analyze two major problems that have arisen tnder this
section. The author of this Note considers the soundness
of the NLRB's position on whether an employer's unfair
labor practices should serve as a defense or result in mod-
ification to the requirements of section 8(b)(7)(C). In ad-
dition, he suggests a change in the NLRB's procedure in
these cases to better achieve the desirable objectives em-
braced within the new section.
The 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments to the National La-
bor Relations Acte imposed new restrictions on the right of unions
1. The pertinent provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, are:
8 (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents-
* (7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause
to be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or
requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organiza-
tion as the representative of his employees, or forcing or requiring
the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organ-
ization as their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor
organization is currently certified as the representative of such em-
ployees:
(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accord-
ance with this Act any other labor organization and a question con-
cerning representation may not appropriately be raised under section
9(c) of this Act,
(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election
under section 9(c) of this Act has been conducted, or
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a peti-
tion under section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time
not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing:
Provided, That when such a petition has been filed the Board shall
forthwith, without regard to the provisions of section 9(c)(1) or the
absence of a showing of a substantial interest on the part of the labor
organization, direct an election in such unit as the Board finds to be
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to engage in picketing for the purpose of organizing employees
or obtaining recognition from an employer.2 The legislative his-
tory of the amendments indicates that these restrictions caused
some of the most impassioned and conflicting debates.3 Congress
appropriate and shall certify the results thereof: Provided further,
That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit
any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising
the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ
members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization, unless an
effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any
other person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver
or transport any goods or not to perform any services.
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Grif-
fin Act) § 704(c), 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(A)(B)(C)
(Supp. III, 1962), amending National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8,
49 Stat. 449 (1935).
2. Recognition picketing refers to activity by a union directed to ob-
taining the employer's recognition that it is the bargaining representative
of his employees. Organizational picketing refers to activity that is directed
to obtaining the majority of the employees' consent that the union may act
as their bargaining representative. Any distinction between the two is speci-
ous, however, since picketing for either objective is ultimately aimed at
obtaining exclusive bargaining status with the employer. Also, both apply
the same kind of pressure on the employer and employees in the form of
economic coercion through possible loss of business by the employer
and the accompanying decrease in available work for the employees. Thus,
the Landrum-Griffin amendments did not draw any distinction between
these two types of picketing. See Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments
to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257, 265 (1959);
Petro, Recognition Picketing Under the National Labor Relations Act, 2
LAB. L.J. 803, 805 (1951); Rothenberg, Organizational Picketing, 5
LAB. L.J. 689 (1954); Young, Picketing Under the 1959 Amendments,
N.Y.U. 13TH CONF. ON LABOR 213, 235 (1960).
Under the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, recognition or organizational picket-
ing was banned by § 8(b)(4)(C) only when there was another labor or-
ganization certified as the representative of the employees. See NLRB v.
Knitgoods Workers' Union, 267 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1959). Under the so-
called Curtis doctrine, the Board also held that picketing by a minority
union to force the employer to recognize it constituted restraint of the
employees in the exercise of their right under § 7 to participate or re-
frain from participation in union activity and therefore violated § 8(b)
(1)(A). See Drivers Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957) (Curtis Brothers, Inc.).
See also International Ass'n of Machinists, 121 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1958).
In 1960, the Supreme Court rejected the Curtis doctrine and held that
peaceful picketing for recognition purposes does not restrain employees in
the exercise of their rights guaranteed by § 7 and, therefore, does not
violate § 8(b)(1)(A). NLRB v. Drivers Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960), deny-
ing enforcement of 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957); see Note, 42 MINN. L. REV.
459 (1958); Note, 44 VA. L. REV. 741 (1958).
3. See 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RE-
PORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 [hereinafter cited as LEGIs. HIST.],
at 976 (remarks of Senator Goldwater), 993 (remarks of Senator Dirk-
sen), 1028-29 (remarks of Senator Goldwater), 1155 (remarks of Senator
Holland), 1175 (remarks of Senator McClellan), 1176 (remarks of Senator
Kennedy), 1176 (remarks of Senator Ervin), 1189 (remarks of Senator
1014
seemed to be primarily concerned with protecting employers from
prolonged picketing for recognition or organization by a union
representing only a minority of the employees.' Such picketing for
an extended period of time is unfair to the employer since he can-
not lawfully recognize a minority union. When recognition is with-
held, however, he may be economically harmed due to an em-
ployee work stoppage, interruption of deliveries from other em-
ployers, or loss of business from consumers sympathetic to the
union's appeal. To stop such picketing, an employer in this situa-
tion may pressure his employees to join the union so that he can
lawfully recognize it.5 Furthermore, employees, who are aware of
possible harm to their employer's business and consequently to
their jobs, may attempt to halt the picketing by joining the union.6
Either of these results is contrary to the policy of the federal
labor statutes that protect the employee's right to join a union free
of either union or employer coercion.7
Congress enacted section 8(b) (7) to protect employers from
prolonged minority union picketing and to secure the right of
employees to freely choose their collective bargaining representa-
tive.' Section 8(b) (7) (A) prohibits picketing for recognition or
organizational purposes when the employer has "lawfully recog-
nized 9 another union and a question concerning representation
Morse), 1318 (remarks of Senator Morse), 1673 (remarks of Representa-
tive Porter), 1728-29 (remarks of Representative Roosevelt), 1738 (re-
marks of Representative Vanik) (1959).
4. See Schauffler v. Local 1357, Retail Clerks Ass'n, 199 F. Supp.
357 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Greene v. International Typographical Union, 182
F. Supp. 788 (D. Conn. 1960); McLeod v. Chefs Union, 181 F. Supp.
742 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Chefs Union, 130 N.L.R.B. 543 (1961).
5. See 2 LEGIS. HIsT. 1290 (remarks of Senator Goldwater), 1813 (re-
marks of Representative Borden); Cox, supra note 2, at 266.
6. See 1 LEGIS. HIST. 471 (S. Rep. No. 187); 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1155 (re-
marks of Representative Holland), 1290 (remarks of Senator Goldwater),
1446 (remarks of Senator Ervin), 1567 (remarks of Representative Griffin),
1657-58 (remarks of Representative Landrum).
7. See Meltzer, Organizational Picketing and the NLRB: Five on A
Seesaw, 30 U. CI. L. REV. 78, 79 (1962).
8. See International Hod Carriers, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962), where
the Board stated that the congressional purpose behind § 8(b)(7) was to
provide the machinery of a Board election to quickly resolve the
doubt concerning the majority status of a union when it requests recognition
and- engages in picketing for that objective. See also Comment, 9
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 666 (1962), where it is suggested that one of the ma-jor concerns of Congress in passing § 8(b)(7) was to eliminate picketing
for -recognition or organization when it causes interruption of the em-
ployer's business due to stoppage of deliveries or services. This comment
also points out that the section seeks to insure that decisions by employers
and-employees .regarding union representation 'will be free of coercion and
economic pressure. See 76 HARV. L. REv. 647 (1963).
9. This provision was inserted to allow picketing of an employer who
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cannot be raised under section 9(c) of the act."0 Such picketing is
also prohibited by section 8(b)(7)(B) when there has been a
"valid election" within the preceding 12 months. 1 If the picketing
is not prohibited by either of these provisions, a union may en-
gage in picketing for recognition or organizational purposes. With-
in a reasonable time, however, but not exceeding 30 days,12 sec-
tion 8(b) (7) (C) requires a petition to be filed with the National
Labor Relations Board requesting a representation election. If the
union shows that it satisfies the substantial interest requirement of
section 9 (c), 3 a hearing is held, 4 and if a genuine issue of rep-
has signed an agreement with a union that is not entitled to recognition.
For example, it is unlawful to recognize a union that represents only a
minority of the employees or one that obtained its majority through
coercive activities. Also, there is no lawful recognition when the union is
dominated by the employer. See, e.g., Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp., 122
N.L.R.B. 1289 (1959).
10. The language in regard to the raising of a representation issue under§ 9(c) could bar picketing whenever the union is unable to prove that it
represents 30% of the employees. However, commentators have viewed this
language as referring to the contract bar rule of the Board. See Burstein,
Picketing-A Management Point of View, N.Y.U. 14TH CONF. ON LABOR
11, 17 (1961); Come, Picketing Under the 1959 Amendments to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, N.Y.U. 13TH CONF. ON LABOR 185, 186(1960); Cox, supra note 2, at 265.
11. This provision extends the freedom of employees to choose a col-
lective bargaining representative as expressed in the Wagner Act. The em-
ployees are now protected from the economic pressure of picketing after
they have rejected a union in a Board election. Thus, the act now em-
phasizes the right of the employees to have no union, which is arguably
a part of the employees' right to self-determination. See Cox, supra note 2.
at 265-66.
The 12 month period begins to run from the time of certification by
the Board of the results of the election rather than from the time of the
balloting. Local 692, Retail Store Employees Union, 134 N.L.R.B. 686(1961).
12. The Board and the courts agree that under certain circumstances
the act allows a shorter period than 30 days to be imposed as the per-
missible time in which a petition must be filed. In one case, the court is-
sued a temporary injunction against recognition picketing after only ten
days because violence had occured. Cuneo v. United Shoe Workers Union,
181 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1960). See also Local 239, Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters, 127 N.L.R.B. 958 (1960), enforcement granted, 289 F.2d 41 (2d Cir.
1961).
13. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.17-.18 (1963) (NLRB). When a petition for
a representation election is filed, the union must show that it presently rep-
resents at least 30% of the employees. This is usually accomplished by
presenting union authorization cards signed by the employees.
14. The first proviso to § 8(b)(7)(C) provides that when a petition is
filed, an election shall be held "forthwith, without regard to the provi-
sions of section 9(c)(1) or the absence of a showing of a substantial inter-
est on the part of the labor organization." Despite this language, the
Board uses this expedited election procedure only when there is a complaint
filed under § 8(b)(7)(C). In the absence of a complaint, the Board holds
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resentation is present, an election is ordered. If a majority of the
employees vote in favor of the union, it will be "certified" and
expressly exempt from the picketing restrictions of section 8(b)
(7).15 When an election petition is not filed within a reasonable
time after the picketing commences, the employer may request
the Board to take action. A regional officer of the Board under-
takes an investigation, and if he finds that the picketing has
recognition or organization as an objective, a complaint will be
issued. Upon issuance of a complaint, section 10(1) requires the
Board's regional officer to petition for a temporary injunction
against the picketing. 6 In such a case, the first proviso to sec-
tion 8(b) (7) (C) provides for an expedited election without a
pre-election hearing.'7 By dispensing with such a hearing, the
Board is able to quickly resolve the issue of whether the union
a hearing to determine the appropriate representation unit, what em-
ployees are eligible to vote, and whether the union represents a substantial
number of employees. This procedure has received the approval of the
Second Circuit. See NLRB v. Local 239, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 289 F.2d
41 (2d Cir. 1961); cf. Reed v. Roumell, 185 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Mich.
1960); International Hod Carriers, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962). The Board
has probably taken the wisest approach since the lack of a hearing might
readily result in an invalid election because of an erroneous determination
of the appropriate unit or what employees may vote.
In Local 239 and Rounell, the courts held that the complaint against
the union must be filed by the employer or an employee without any in-
stigation or assistance from the union to bring into effect the expedited
election procedure.
15. Certification does not last indefinitely. After a period of one year, a
representation issue may be raised with the Board for an election to either
de-certify the presently certified union or to resolve the competing claims
for the right to represent a unit of employees. The "certification bar rule"
does, however, operate to bar an election for one year. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.61 (1963) (NLRB); Note, 69 YALE L.J 1393, 1403 (1960).
16. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.37 (1963) (NLRB). Before the regional officer
may petition for the temporary injunction, he must investigate the § 8(b)
(7)(C) charge. The court will issue a temporary injunction if it is proved
that the officer has "reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and
that a complaint should issue." McLeod v. Local 239, Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters, 179 F. Supp. 481, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). It is not necessary for the
officer to prove that the charges are true or that there has in fact been
a violation of § 8(b)(7(C). See ibid.
17. Cf. note 14 supra. The union will have an opportunity for a hearing
in the event that it loses the election and continues picketing for the pro-
scribed objectives. When a complaint is issued under § 8(b)(7)(B), the union
may challenge the regional director's findings under the § 8(b)(7)(C) com-
plaint as to the objective and duration of the picketing. The union may also
challenge the conduct of the election in regard to selection of the appro-
priate.representation unit and selection of employees eligible to vote. The
opportunity for a later hearing before the union is subject to the picketing
ban of § 8(b)(7)(B) has led one court to hold that there is no denial of
due process. Department Store Employees Union v. Brown, 187 F. Supp.
619 (N.D. Cal. 1960); see Come, supra note 10, at 189-90.
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has majority status among the employees in an appropriate bar-
gaining unit.
When an employer has committed unfair labor practices under
section 8(a), the argument has been made that picketing for rec-
ognition or organization and in protest of the employer's unfair
labor practices should be exempt from the limitations of section
8(b) (7) (C). To decide this issue, the Board has had to resolve
the dilemma created by a union's desire to engage in unlimited
recognition or organizational picketing and the employer's desire
to avoid economic coercion. The purpose of this Note is to con-
sider to what extent an employer's unfair labor practices should
exempt recognition or organizational picketing from the restric-
tions of section 8(b) (7) (C) or should cause the Board to modify
its normal procedure in resolving the representation issue that
is raised by such picketing.
I. SECTION 8(a)(1) TO 8(a)(4) VIOLATIONS AND
THE PICKETING RESTRICTIONS OF SECTION 8 (b) (7)
A. As A DEFENSE TO PICKETING RESTRICTION
1. Position of the NLRB
Sections 8(a) (1) to 8(a) (4) are intended to protect the right
of employees to freely select their bargaining representative and to
engage in union activities.'" These sections make it an unfair la-
bor practice for an employer to coerce, interfere, or discriminate
in any way that will affect the rights of employees to organize."
In 1961, the Board decided two cases in which the unions
contended that an employer's unfair labor practices under these
sections constituted a defense to the requirements of section 8(b)
18. See generally SMITH & MERRIFIELD, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 77-219
(rev. ed. 1960).
19. The relevant portions of those sections are:
8(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(I) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 7.(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration
of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to
it . .
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage mem-
bership in any labor organization ....
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee
because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act.
National Labor Relations Act § 8, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)-(4) (1958).
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(7) (C)."0 In both cases, it was conceded that recognition picket-
ing was involved for more than 30 days without an election pe-
tition being filed. The unions argued that they should not be
subject to a complaint for an unfair labor practice because the
employer had been found guilty of violating sections 8 (a) (1) and
8(a) (3) during the time of the picketing. The unions feared that
if a petition were filed, the Board would proceed with an elec-
tion at a time when the employer's unfair labor practice would
prevent the employees from freely selecting their bargaining
agent. Therefore, since Congress intended an election to be con-
ducted when the employees are not being coerced by an em-
ployer's anti-union conduct, they contended that there should be
no filing requirement until the employer's unfair labor practices
had been remedied by the Board. The unions also argued that
their picketing was not within the provisions of section 8(b) (7)
(C) since it was not only for recognition, but was also to protest
the employer's unfair labor practices.
The Board rejected these arguments and held that section 8
(b) (7) (C) forbids a non-certified union from picketing for rec-
ognition or organization beyond a maximum period of 30 days
unless it files a petition for an election. If a petition is not filed
within a reasonable time, the picketing will be immediately en-
joined. The Board reasoned that even though the picketing may
have other legitimate objectives, such as protesting an em-
ployer's unfair labor practices,21 section 8(b) (7) applies to any
picketing that has recognition or organization as one of its objec-
tives. The language of the statute supports the Board's reasoning
that Congres did not intend to limit the application of section 8
(b) (7) to picketing that has recognition or organization as its
sole objective. The use of the language "the object" was rejected
in favor of the more comprehensive definition of prohibited picket-
ing embraced in the language "an object. 2 2
20. International Typographical Union, 130 N.L.R.B. 727 (1961) (Charl-
ton Press, Inc.); International Hod Carriers, 130 N.L.R.B. 587 (1961)(Charles A. Blinne). See also Chefs Union, 130 N.L.R.B. 543 (1961) (Stork
Restaurant, Inc.) (dictum).
21. Of course, when the picketing is solely to protest the unfair conduct
of an employer, it is not banned under § 8(b)(7). A problem arises, how-
ever, when a majority union pickets against the employer's unlawful re-
fusal to bargain. Picketing in that situation clearly has recognition as an
objective. See Come, supra note 10, at 193; Van Arkel, Picketing Under
the 1959 Amendments, N.Y.U. 13TH CONF. ON LABOR 201, 203-05(1960); 2 LEGIS. HisT. 1377 (remarks of Senator Kennedy), 1429 (re-
marks of Senator Morse).
22. The Kennedy-Ervin Bill, which passed the Senate, proscribed picket-
ing that had- recognition or organization as "the object." 1 LEGis.
19631 NOTES 1019
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1013
The Board concluded that the employer's unfair labor practice
should not constitute a defense to a complaint for violation of sec-
tion 8(b) (7) (C) because Congress had specifically rejected such
a proposal. The legislative history indicates, however, that it
is doubtful whether Congress considered making an employer's
unfair labor practice a defense to a complaint for violation of sec-
tion 8(b) (7) (C). 23 None of the bills proposed in either the
Senate or the House contained language to this effect.24 Congress
did consider, however, a proposal to make all section 8 (a) charges
against the employer a defense to an injunction against picketing
alleged to be in violation of section 8(b) (7) (C). 2" This proposal
was passed in the Senate, but rejected by the House.26 The Lan-
drum-Griffin Bill as passed by the House provided for a manda-
tory injunction under section 10 (1) in all cases where a complaint
was filed under section 8(b) (7) (C) regardless of the employer's
unfair labor practices.27 This conflict in the Senate and House
bills was compromised in the conference committee, and the fi-
nal version of the Landrum-Griffin Act exempted recognition and
organizational picketing from an injunction only when there is a
section 8(a) (2) charge against the employer;s this provision,
contained in section 10(l), is the only exemption for employer
unfair labor practices in the statutory scheme for the regulation of
recognition and organization picketing.29 Thus, even though Con-
gress did reject a defense based upon the employer's unfair labor
practices to the injunction provisions of section 10(1),30 such a
HIST. 583 (S. 1555); see 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1361 (remarks of Senator Gold-
water).
23. But see Come, supra note 10, at 190-91; Note, 21 U. Prrr. L. REV.
709, 717-19 (1960); cf. note 31 infra.
24. See Cox, supra note 2, at 265 n.36.
25. 1 LEGIs. HIST. 584, 757-58; 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1290 (remarks of Sena-
tor Goldwater), 1425 (remarks of Senator Morse).
26. 1 LEGIS. HIST. 584 (quoting the pertinent portion of S. 1555);
2 LEGIS. HIST. 1691.
27. 1 LEGIS. HIST. 685.
28. 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1428-29 (remarks of Senator Morse), 1720 (remarks
of Representative Thompson), 1712 (remarks of Representative Griffin);
see I LEGIS. HIST. 934, 944 (quoting the text of the Landrum-Griffin
Bill, H.R. 8400, after its amendment in the conference committee).
29. See 1 LEGIs. HIST. 934.
30. The legislative history fails to disclose why Congress exempted
picketing from an injunction when there is a § 8(a)(2) charge against the
employer, but did not give such an exemption for other violations of § 8(a)
by an employer. The arguments to permit continued picketing in the § 8
(a)(2) situations seem to apply equally to the other provisions of § 8(a).
One member of Congress has suggested that the § 8(a)(2) exemption is of
small importance since there are few charges against an employer for
domination or active support of a union. See 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1428 (remarks
of Senator Morse). Thus, it appears that the House conferees prevailed on
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defense to the filing of an election petition under section 8(b)
(7) (C) should not be rejected on the basis of legislative history.3"
2. Position of the Federal Courts
The courts have taken the position that an employer's unfair la-
bor practices are not a defense to an injunction against picketing
allegedly in violation of section 8(b) (7).32 To reach this result,
the courts have relied on the legislative history and the language
of the act. They have reasoned that the only defense to the in-
junction is the section 8(a) (2) violation provided for in section
10(1). This reasoning seems correct in the light of sound princi-
this issue and accepted the § 8(a)(2) exemption as a perfunctory gesture
of compromise. See also International Hod Carriers, 130 N.L.R.B. 587,
593 (1961) (Charles A. Blinne).
31. For the assertion that Congress specifically considered and rejected
proposals for defenses to § 8(b)(7), the Board relied on a resolution pro-
posed by former Senator Kennedy to instruct the Senate conferees to urge
an amendment to § 10(1) providing that a charge against the employer for
violation of § 8(a) "shall be a defense both to the application for a tem-
porary restraining order and to any complaint issued under section 10(b)."
2 LEGIS. HIST. 1383. The Board argued from this that Congress was opposed
to any such defense since the conferees considered this proposal but did
not adopt it. See International Hod Carriers, 130 N.L.R.B. 587, 589(1961) (Charles A. Blinne).
The second Blinne case correctly pointed out that the Board's conclu-
sion from this portion of the legislative history was erroneous. There is no
evidence that the resolution was adopted by the Senate or that the pro-
posal was either submitted to or considered by the conference committee.
International Hod Carriers, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1163 n.21 (1962) (Charles
A. Blinne). After noting the Board's earlier error, however, the majority
opinion in the second Blinne case drew a very doubtful conclusion in re-
gard to the Kennedy-Ervin Bill provisions. That bill provided in § I0(1)
that when a charge is filed under § 8(b)(7), it would be a defense to an
injunction that the employer has committed an unfair labor practice with-
in the meaning of § 8(a). The Board viewed this as a proposal to have § 8(a) violations serve as a defense to a complaint under § 8(b)(7)
and to an injunction under § 10(1). Members Rodgers and Leedom point-
ed out that this was an incorrect interpretation of the bill. 135 N.L.R.B.
at 1171 n.36 (dissenting opinion). See also Cox, supra note 2, at 265
n.36.
32. See, e.g., Cosentino v. Local 618, Automotive Employees Union,
200 F. Supp. 492 (E.D. Mo. 1960); Greene v. International Typographical
Union, 182 F. Supp. 788 (D. Conn. 1960). See generally McCulloch, New
Problems in the Administration of the Labor-Management Relations
Act: The Taft-Hartley Injunction, 16 SW. L.J. 82 (1962).
One court has held that an injunction continues until final disposition of
the § 8(b)(7)(C) charge or the passage of an unreasonable time, which-
ever occurs first. The union moved to dissolve the temporary injunction
because two years had passed and the Board had not yet finally decided
the case. In granting the motion, the court held that a period of two years
is an unreasonable time to continue the injunction in the absence of un-
usual circumstances. Getreu v. International Typographical Union, 205 F.
Supp. 931 (S.D. Ohio 1962).
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ples of statutory construction; the specific mention of section 8
(a)(2) in section 10(1) indicates that other section 8(a) viola-
tions were not to constitute a defense to the statute's injunction
procedure.3
The courts have also reasoned that since the injunction proced-
ure is an essential part of the statutory scheme to limit recognition
picketing,' the effectiveness of section 8(b)(7) would be
seriously hampered if such picketing were exempt from an injunc-
tion whenever a section 8(a) charge is made." The purpose of
the injunction procedure is to protect employers from prolonged
economic pressure resulting from recognition picketing in cases
where the union's right to be recognized is in doubt."0 Further-
more, Congress may have assumed that a union's failure to file a
timely election petition indicates that it is a minority union and,
therefore, is attempting to avoid an early election. Prolonged
recognition or organizational picketing in such a case is the evil that
section 8(b) (7) was intended to limit. Therefore, the renognition
picketing should be temporarily ended until the union's right to
recognition is determined in a Board-conducted election. Further-
more, enjoining the recognition or organizational picketing
allows the employees to express their views on the representation
issue free of coercion by the employer or the union. Thus, in view
of the purposes of the injunction procedure, rejection of any
defense to section 10(1) based upon the employer's labor prac-
tice appears correct even though the section 8(a) charge may
be sufficiently meritorious to warrant issuance of a complaint
or is found to have merit on final disposition.
B. As MODIFYING NORMAL ELECTION PROCEDURES
The Board has recently clarified the procedure that it will fol-
low in cases where it is alleged that the union has violated sec-
tion 8(b) (7) (C) and the union charges that the employer is
guilty of an unfair labor practice under sections 8 (a)( 1 ) to 8 (a)
33. See 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§
4830, 4936 (3d ed. 1943).
34. See Schauffler v. Local 1357, Retail Clerks Ass'n, 199 F. Supp.
357 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Cosentino v. Local 618, Automotive Employees
Union, 200 F. Supp. 492 (E.D. Mo. 1960); Greene v. International Typo-
graphical Union, 182 F. Supp. 788 (D. Conn. 1960); McLeod v. Local 239,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 179 F. Supp. 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). See generally
Young, supra note 2, at 220-26.
35. See Cosentino v. Local 618, Automotive Employees Union, 200
F. Supp. 492 (E.D. Mo. 1960); Greene v. International Typographical
Union, 182 F. Supp. 788 (D. Conn. 1960).
36. Ibid.
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(4) . In the International Hod Carriers case," the Board conclud-
ed that when the election petition is timely filed and the employer is
charged with an unremedied violation under sections 8(a) (1) to
8(a) (4), the election will be postponed until final disposition of
the unfair labor practice charges against the employer. The Board
reasoned that although Congress intended that an election peti-
tion should always be filed within 30 days, it did not intend an
election to be held at a time when the employer's unfair labor prac-
tices would prevent a fair and free expression of the employees'
choice. Delaying the election insures a union that it will not be
subjected to an election it is likely to lose as a result of the em-
ployer's unfair conduct. 9 The Board concluded, however, that it
is essential to the statutory scheme to have a petition filed within a
reasonable time to permit a rapid resolution of the representation
issue as soon as the section 8 (a) proceedings are completed. With-
out a petition on file, a union could picket for an additional 30
days after disposition of the section 8(a) charges before an elec-
tion petition would be mandatory. Thus, the Board's procedure has
the effect of restricting the length of time that recognition or or-
ganizational picketing may continue before an election is held.
Furthermore, the statute contemplates that an election always
be held after a union engages in recognition picketing to decide the
representation issue raised by such activity. To protect employers
and employees from continued recognition picketing after a Board
election, section 8(b) (7) (B) prohibits such picketing for one
year after any election. If a petition were not filed, however,
and the union ceased picketing after resolution of the section 8(a)
charges, there would be no election, and this objective of the
statutory scheme would be frustrated.40
The Board has found further support for its delayed election
procedure in the language of section 8(b) (7) (B). That section
operates to bar recognition or organizational picketing for 12
months after a "valid election." A "valid election" would seem
to mean one held at a time when the employees are free of pres-
sure or coercion from either the employer or the union in their
choice of a bargaining representative. Thus, the delayed election
37. International Typographical Union, 135 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1962) (Charl-
ton Press, Inc.); International Hod Carriers, 135 N.LR.B. 1153 (1962)(Charles A. Blinne). These were the same cases that came before the
Board in 1961 in which the unions initially argued the question of de-
fenses to § 8(b)(7). The unions requested reconsideration of these cases
after the appointment of two new Board members in 1961.
38. International Hod Carriers, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1165-66 (1962).
39. Id. at 1165:-
40. Ibid.
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procedure may be necessary in such a case to satisfy the statutory
requirements of section 8 (b) (7) (B). 41
C. EVALUATION
Although the language and purpose of section 8(b) (7) does
not condone the use of an employer's unfair labor practice as a
defense to a complaint or an injunction against recognition or or-
ganizational picketing, it would be unfair to a union and frustrate
the statutory objective of a free election if an employer's violations
of section 8 (a) were to be completely disregarded." If the union
files a timely election petition under section 8 (b) (7) (C), the reg-
ular procedures for processing representation petitions, including
a pre-election hearing,43 will be used.44 During this hearing, the
union may show that a charge is pending against the employer for
violations of section 8(a) and that because of these alleged vio-
lations, an immediate election may not accurately reflect the em-
ployees' desires concerning representation.45 When such facts are
shown, the Board should delay the election until the unfair labor
practice charge against the employer is resolved.46 This procedure
41. Ibid. The Board declared that § 8(b)(7) envisages an election that
will represent the "free and uncoerced choice of the employee electo-
rate." Section 8(b)(7)(B) does not ban picketing after an election when the
employees were restrained or coerced by the union or the employer.
42. See Come, supra note 10, at 191-92; Dunau, A Preliminary Look
at Section 8(b)(7), 48 GEO. L.J. 371, 377 (1959); Kammholz, Two Years
With Section 8(b)(7), 16 Sw. L.J. 134, 136-37 (1962); Van Arkel, supra
note 21, at 203-04; Note, 21 U. PiTr. L. REV. 709, 718-19 (1960).
43. A timely filed petition will protect the union from a § 8(b)(7)(C)
charge and, therefore, the expedited election procedure is inapplicable. See
note 14 supra.
44. See Labor Management Relations Act § 9(c)(1), 61 Stat. 136, 144
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (c)(1) (1958):
9 (c)(1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance
with such regulations as may be prescribed by by the Board-
(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual
or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that a sub-
stantial number of employees (i) wish to be represented for col-
lective bargaining and that their employer declines to recognize
their representative as the representative defined in subsection
(a) of this section . . .
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable
cause to believe that a question of representation affecting commerce
exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice.
. . . If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a
question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret
ballot and shall certify the results thereof.
45. See authorities cited in note 42 supra.
46. See International Hod Carriers, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1165 (1962),
International Hod Carriers, 130 N.L.R.B. 587, 592 (1961) (Member Fan-
ning, dissenting).
The Board has also found support for delaying the election from the
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will accomplish the statutory objective of insuring the right of the
employees to freely select a bargaining representative. Since the
picketing will be permitted to continue until completion of the
election, 7 the union will have an opportunity to counteract any
adverse effects the employer's conduct may have had on its or-
ganizational efforts.
4
The Board's delayed election procedure seems to be the fairest
resolution of the conflicting interests involved in such cases.
Arguably, however, the Board may overcompensate in favor of
a union when it permits the picketing to continue until the section
8(a) charges are resolved.49 Although a union should have some
opportunity for continued picketing before the election is held, pic-
keting throughout the period required for resolution of an 8(a)
case may result in serious consequences to the employer. Since
disposition of a contested unfair labor practice charge requires an
average time of 475 days,"0 continued recognition or organization-
al picketing may economically destroy an employer. Confronted
with this possibility, an employer may recognize a union, even
though it is not a majority representative, merely to end the pic-
keting.51
fact that it had long been the Board's practice to delay an election
under § 9(c) when there was a meritorious charge against the employer
for violating any of the provisions of § 8(a). See Weyerhaeuser Co., 134
N.L.R.B. 1381 (1961). If the election was held despite the employer's
unfair labor practices, the union could file an exception and petition for a
new election. On a showing by the union that the employer had inter-
fered with the employees' choice of a bargaining representative and there-
by affected the outcome of the election, the Board vacated and set aside
the election. See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 329
(1959); Edward J. Schlachter Meat Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1952);
Marshalltown Trowel Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 1050 (1949).
47. See International Hod Carriers, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1165 (1962).
48. The Board might require the union to prove that the employer's
unfair labor practices under § 8(a)(l)-(4) are likely to affect the outcome
of an immediate election. A per se rule that the unfair conduct always
has such an effect seems somewhat inconsistent with the Board's recent
trend to dispense with the mechanical regulation of labor relations involved
in the use of such rules. See generally Christensen, The "New" NLRB:
An Analysis of Current Policy, N.Y.U. 15TH CONF. ON LABOR 213, 219-31
(1962); McDermott, Recognitional and Organizational Picketing Under
Amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 10 (1960);
cf. Fruit Packers Union v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962). It
seems apparent, however, that any conduct by an employer that warrants
issuance of a complaint under § 8(a) is probably going to have some ef-
fect on the election if it is held before the unfair conduct is remedied.
49. See generally Wollenberger, The Trouble With 8(bX7)(C), 13 LAB.
L.J 284-85 (1962).
50. See Report of the Advisory Panel on Labor-Management Relations
Law to the- Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on the Or-
ganization and Procedure of the NLRB, 48 LAB. REL. REP. 336 (1960).
51. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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Since one of the purposes of section 8(b)(7) is to protect an
employer from being forced to recognize a non-qualified union,52
Board procedure that may expose the employer to such a choice
would seem inconsistent with the policy of the act. Allowing
recognition or organizational picketing for such an extended pe-
riod of time may also interfere with the employees' right to self-
determination. The employer may encourage the employees to
join the union to enable him to lawfully recognize it. Continued
picketing in such cases seems even more unjustified when the
section 8 (a) charge is eventually resolved in favor of the employer.
Since organizational picketing may be essential for the union
to maintain or increase its support among the employees until an
election is held, this analysis is not intended to suggest that there
should be no picketing during disposition of the section 8(a)
charges. The Board should not permit continued picketing, how-
ever, when the picketed employer is able to show that the recog-
nition or organizational picketing is causing, or is likely to cause,
substantial economic harm to his business.53 Although a few in-
terruptions of deliveries or the loss of a few customers would not
seem to be a sufficient reason to end the picketing,54 the picketing
should be curtailed when the very economic life of the employer
is threatened.
IV. SECTION 8(a)(5) AS A DEFENSE TO THE
PICKETING RESTRICTIONS OF SECTION 8(b) (7)
Section 8 (a) (5) of the act provides that the employer must bar-
gain collectively with the bargaining representative designated by
a majority of the employees. 5 A successful complaint under
this section requires a finding by the Board that the union in fact
represents a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargain-
ing unit and that the employer has refused to bargain with that
representative in "good faith."56 The Board concluded in the
52. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
53. Cf. Fruit Packers Union v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
54. Cf. Retail Clerks Union, 51 L.R.R.M. 1053, 1057 (1962).
55. Section 8(a)(5) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees .... ." National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8, 49 Stat.
453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1958). See gener-
ally Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n 40, Railway Employees, 300 U.S. 515
(1937). The legislative background of the Wagner Act's statutory duty to
bargain is found in Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty To Bargain" Con-
cept in American Law, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1065 (1941).
56. See, e.g., Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939);
Highland Park Mfg. Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1238 (1939). For an article discussing
the "good faith" test in § 8(a)(5), see Feinsinger, The National Labor Re-
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Blinne case that a charge against the employer under section 8
(a)(5) that is found to be meritorious on initial investigation
will exempt a union engaging in recognition or organizational pic-
keting from the requirement of filing an election petition under
8(b) (7) (C).17 The union may, therefore, continue picketing un-
til final disposition of the refusal to bargain charge without be,
ing subject to a complaint under section 8(b) (7) (C).'
The union should not be required to file an election petition
when there is a section 8(a) (5) charge pending against the em-
ployer because such a charge and a petition for an election are
based on inherently inconsistent positions. A refusal to bargain
charge presupposes that the union represents a majority of the
employees, while a representation petition indicates that there is
doubt over the majority status of the union. The Board pointed
out that because of this basic inconsistency, it has always refused
to .process a petition for a representation election under section
9(c) when a meritorious 8(a)(5) charge has been filed.
The same considerations apply where a meritorious Section 8(a)(5)
charge is filed in a Section 8(b)(7)(C) context. Congressional acqui-
escence in the Board's long-standing practice prior to the enactment
of Section -8(b)(7)(C) imports, in our view, Congressional approval of
a continuatioh of that practice thereafter.59
The dissenting Board members argued that the language of sec-
tion 8(b) (7) (C) fails to support the Board's conclusion since it
recognized no exceptions to the requirement of an election petition.
Furthermore, they maintained that since Congress rejected a pro-
posal for such an exemption, to excuse the filing of an election
petition because-of a pending section 8(a) (5) charge was con-
trary to legislative intent. The dissent also contended that a pend-
ing refusal to bargain charge is not inconsistent with the mere
filing of an election petition if the election petition is held in
abeyance. Therefore, to facilitate a quick resolution of the repre-
sentation issue, the union should be required to file an election
petition in all cases where it has engaged in recognition and or-
ganizational picketing for a reasonable time. If initial investigation
lations Act and Collective Bargaining, 57 MICIL L. REV. 807 (1959). See
also Majure v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1952).
57. International Hod Carriers, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962) (Charles A.
Blinne); accord, International Typographical Union, 135 N.LR.B. 1178
(1962). A § 8(a)(5) violation by the employer is a defense to § 8(b)(7)(C)
picketing only if the union has actually filed the refusal to bargain charge
with the Board. See International Typographical Union, 50 LR.R.M. 1156
(1962).
58. See International Hod Carriers, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1166 n.24
(1962).
59. Ibid.
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shows that the refusal to bargain charge has merit and warrants
issuance of a complaint, the election petition can be dismissed;
if the section 8(a) (5) charge is found to lack merit, an immediate
election can be held if an election petition is on file."0
The result in the Blinne case may be justified on the ground
that a meritorious charge under section 8 (a) (5) indicates that the
union probably possesses majority status. In the initial processing
of a section 8(a) (5) charge, a Board officer investigates the
majority status of the union; if the union is unable to prove its
claim on that issue, a complaint is not issued." Thus, in a meri-
torious section 8(a) (5) charge, there is a finding by a Board of-
ficer, even though informal, on the union's majority status. One of
the purposes of section 8(b) (7) was to limit recognition or or-
ganizational picketing by a union under circumstances where the
employer could not lawfully recognize and bargain with it. 2
Therefore, when a Board officer has found "reasonable cause"
to believe that the union possesses majority status, the reasons
for limiting recognition or organizational picketing may not be
present. If the union in fact has majority status and the employer
refuses to bargain with its designated representative, there is clearly
no need to protect the employer from continued picketing since
the picketing is the result of his violation of a statutory duty.
This reasoning seems to ignore the language of section 8(b)
(7), however, which exempts only a "currently certified" union.
Furthermore, the Board and the courts have uniformly held that
a majority union is not exempt from the operation of section 8 (b)
(7) (C).63 The reason for such a position, however, would seem
to be to insure, on the basis of a finding by the Board, that the
picketing union has a majority status and may be legally recog-
nized by the employer. When there is a meritorious 8(a) (5)
charge, the union has proved to the satisfaction of a Board officer
that it possesses a majority status and may be legally recognized.
Therefore, the Board's conclusion that the union in such a case is
exempt from the limitations imposed by section 8(b) (7) (C) would
not seem unreasonable. 64
60. 135 N.L.R.B. at 1168-71 & n.35 (dissent).
61. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.4, .5, .6 (1963) (NLRB).
62. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., International Typographical Union, 50 L.R.R.M. 1312
(1962); International Typographical Union, 50 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1962);
International Typographical Union, 130 N.L.R.B. 727 (1961); Greene v.
International Typographical Union, 182 F. Supp. 788 (D. Conn. 1960).
64. But see Christensen, note 48 supra, at 222, where the writer states
that the exemption from § 8(b)(7) in the refusal to bargain situation "is
patently an 'interpretation' rather than a literal reading of the Statute and
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-The Board's position allowing continued recognition and or-
ganizational picketing until resolution of the refusal to bargain
charge seems necessary to enable the union to preserve its repre-
sentation status among the employees.6" During the long period
required to dispose of a contested unfair labor practice charge,68
the union's status may be diminished either from loss of employee
interest or from anti-union conduct not amounting to an unfair
labor practice that is engaged in by the employer. In the event
that the union is unable to maintain its majority status during the
resolution of the refusal to bargain charge, the fact that a petition
is not on file protects it from an election that it might lose if held
immediately after the section 8 (a) (5) decision.'
The length of time after the refusal to bargain charge is settled
that a union will be permitted to engage in recognition and or-
ganizational picketing without filing an election petition is uncer-
tain.6" Arguably, the union should be allowed to picket for "a
reasonable time not to exceed thirty days" after the Board's final
disposition of the refusal to bargain charge. Since a union is al-
lowed to engage in recognition or organizational picketing through-
out the period that the section 8(a) (5) case is being resolved,
however, further picketing to bolster its representative status would
seem unnecessary. Therefore, when picketing continues after
the Board has decided the section 8(a) (5) charge, an election pe-
tition should be filed immediately to avoid any additional delay
of the election. 9
one in conflict with portions of the legislative history"; Lindau, Picketing
and Boycott: A Functional Analysis-Management Viewpoint, N.Y.U. 15TH
CONF. ON LABOR 83, 88 (1962), where the writer argues that the Board
has ignored the legislative history, for a purpose of Congress was to
limit picketing to a "reasonable time," and it is not in accord with this
purpose to permit picketing throughout the disposition of a § 8(a)(5) case-
Whyte, Some Dilemmas in the Injunction Against Recognitional Picketing.
3 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 33-34 (1961).
65. See Come, supra note 10, at 193-95; Cox, supra note 2, at 270;
Van Arkel, supra note 21, at 204-05. In regard to the serious effects of
Board delay in processing representation cases on the organizational ef-
forts of unions, see Report of the Pucinski Subcommittee on Administra-
tion of the Labor-Management Relations Act by the NLRB, 48 LAB.
REL. REP. 9 (1961). For a discussion of subtle methods of anti-union pres-
sure by employers, see Gould, Taft-Hartley Revisited: The Contrariety of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Plight of the Unorganized.
13 LAB. LJ. 348, 350-52 (1962).
66. See Report of the Advisory Panel, supra note 50, at 336.
67. See International Hod Carriers, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1165 (1962).
68. See Comment, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 666, 690-91 (1962), where it
is suggested that the 30 day period does not start to run until the § 8(a)(5) charge is resolved. The author suggested, however, that the Board
will probably require a petition before the end of the full 30 day period.
69. If the union loses in the § 8(a)(5) proceeding and appeals to a court
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The employer's interest should not be completely subverted, how-
ever, in the interest of protecting the union's representative status.
As in all cases, when the employer is able to show that the recog-
nition or organizational picketing is causing, or is likely to cause,
substantial economic harm to his business, the picketing should be
restricted. The Board could accomplish this result by issuing a
complaint under section 8(b) (7) (C) and seeking an injunction
on the ground that the picketing has continued beyond a reason-
able period of time.
of appeals, the Board should immediately require filing of a petition and
proceed with the election. Further picketing during an appeal to the courts
clearly becomes unreasonable and unfair to the employer.
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